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Benefit Corporations: Providing A New Shield for 
Corporations With Ideals Beyond Profits 
Introduction 
In 2011, Patagonia, Inc. became one of the first California-based companies to 
incorporate as a benefit corporation1 in the state of California.2 The founder of 
Patagonia, Yvon Chouinard, stated that being a benefit corporation “allows us to 
have a way that I think the values of my company can continue even after it is sold 
and its way down the line . . . .”3 Patagonia’s corporate purpose has always been 
rooted in an environmental focus–donating time, services and at least 1% of sales to 
environmental groups throughout the world.4 
Also in 2011, Warby Parker, an eyeglass manufacturer, became a benefit 
corporation in New York.5 The founders stated “being a b corp[.] tells the world 
[these are] our values, it also more specifically tells our shareholders that this is 
important for us and we are going to prioritize this.”6 The founders continued, “we 
© 2016 Kristin A. Neubauer 
 * J.D., University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, 2016; B.A. cum laude, Tulane 
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dedicate this comment to her parents, John and Beth, her sisters, Jen and Lindsay, and her brother, Michael, for 
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 1. A “benefit corporation” is defined under the Delaware General Corporation Statute as a “for-profit 
corporation organized under and subject to the requirements of this chapter that is intended to produce a 
public benefit or public benefits and operate in a responsible and sustainable manner.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 
§ 362(a). 
 2. John Tozzi, Patagonia Road Tests New Sustainability Legal Status, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 4, 2012), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-04/patagonia-road-tests-new-sustainability-legal-status.html. 
 3. Yvon Chouinard, Patagonia Founder, Remarks on Importance of a Benefit Corporation, YOUTUBE (Jan. 4, 
2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gm7wM5A7xcA. 
 4. See Becoming a Responsible Company, PATAGONIA, 
http://www.patagonia.com/us/patagonia.go?assetid=2329 (last visited Dec. 17, 2015); see also Patagonia, Inc. 
BCORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/community/patagonia-inc (last visited Dec. 17, 2015). 
 5. Warby Parker, BCORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/community/warby-parker (last visited Dec. 17, 
2015). 
 6. Warby Parker-Why We’re a B Corp, YOUTUBE, (July 15, 2014) (quoting Neil Blumenthal), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a5zA70gnrZ0. Warby Parker’s business purpose is to provide inexpensive, 
trendy glasses and lenses to their customers while at the same time providing glasses and eye exams to the 
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just want to catalyze the private sector to get more involved in solving these huge 
global issues, and we think that the b corp. movement is the best way to do that.”7 
The force behind the rise of the benefit corporate form is the not-for-profit 
corporation B Lab. B Lab lobbies for benefit corporation legislation across the globe 
and has been instrumental in its burgeoning popularity in the United States.8 B Lab 
also certifies corporations as “B corporations” using a multi-step process.9 First, 
corporations seeking certification must complete a “B Survey” that is prepared by B 
Lab staff and tailored to the corporation’s industry.10 Once the corporation 
completes the survey, the staff at B Lab rates the company, and generates a report 
called a “B Report.”11 If the company receives a rating over 80, out of a possible 200, 
it is eligible to become a “B corporation.”12  To complete the certification process, 
the company must then amend its articles of incorporation to include the 
certification as a “B corporation,” sign a declaration of interdependence, and pay a 
licensing fee to B Lab.13 To date, B Lab has certified over 1,000 companies across the 
United States and the globe as “B corporations.”14 
In 2010, Maryland became the first state to embrace this new corporate form and 
pass benefit corporation legislation.15 As of 2015, thirty-one states have fully 
implemented some version of the model benefit corporation legislation created by 
B-Lab, and five other states have introduced legislation.16 
The expansion of benefit corporation legislation across the United States and the 
proliferation of businesses incorporating as benefit corporations lead to new 
questions pertaining to how benefit corporations should be considered in corporate 
almost 1 billion people worldwide who lack access to glasses, and therefore cannot effectively work or learn. See 
id. 
 7. See id. 
 8. See About B Lab, BCORP., https://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/the-non-profit-behind-b-
corps (last visited Dec. 17, 2015). 
 9. See generally Jenna Lawrence, Making the B List, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV., Summer 2009, at 65, 
http://ssir.org/articles/entry/making_the_b_list. 
 10. Id. at 65. The surveys are designed to measure the corporation’s social and environmental performance 
by assessing a company’s governance, environmental impact, community outreach, and employee treatment.  
Id. B Lab created the surveys by combing through existing labor, environmental, and business certification 
programs to develop the “best standards and measures across industries” for determining certifying a business. 
Id.  
 11. Id. at 66. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. B Lab assesses the licensing fee based on a specific percentage of the b corporation’s sales. Id. The 
fees help B Lab maintain their certification standards, conduct audits of b corporations, support policy efforts, 
and promote their cause. Id. 
 14. See generally, B Corporation, BCORP. http://www.bcorporation.net (last visited Dec. 17, 2015). 
 15. John Tozzi, Maryland Passes ‘Benefit Corp.’ Law for Social Entrepreneurs, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Apr. 13, 
2010), 
http://www.businessweek.com/smallbiz/running_small_business/archives/2010/04/benefit_corp_bi.html. 
 16. A full list of state enactments and proposed legislation are located on B Lab’s website. See State by State 
Legislative Status, BENEFITCORP, http://benefitcorp.net/policymakers/state-by-state-status (last visited Oct. 26, 
2015). 
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governance disputes. Part I explains the appeal of the benefit corporate form by 
focusing on the structures and deficiencies of corporate laws governing for profit 
corporations and the severe constraints that incorporating as a not-for-profit 
corporation can pose to companies interested in providing a public benefit.17 Part II 
specifically analyzes the public benefit corporation statute passed in Delaware to 
examine how legislators in this preeminent corporate law jurisdiction created this 
new corporate form.18 Finally, Part III argues that the new Delaware benefit 
corporation legislation permits companies dedicated to philanthropic endeavors to 
more effectively combat hostile corporate maneuvers by companies whose profit-
maximizing motivations threaten these corporations whose business model requires 
them to provide public benefits.19 
I. The Deficiencies of the For Profit and Not-For-Profit Corporate 
Forms 
Delaware’s robust corporate law historically had two types of corporations: for 
profit and not-for-profit.20  The first part of this section focuses on for profit 
corporate law in Delaware, specifically summarizing the fiduciary duties of boards 
of directors and corporate shareholders, and then discussing the principle that for 
profit corporations should primarily pursue goals that maximize their profits.21 The 
second part centers on federal not-for-profit corporate law as adopted in Delaware, 
to examine the non-distribution constraint requirement and to consider how that 
limitation can negatively impact the public benefit goals of a not-for-profit 
corporation.22 
A. For-Profit Corporate Governance in Delaware 
Delaware has an eminent and longstanding reputation in the field of corporate law23 
because Delaware’s General Corporation Law24 is one of the most advanced and 
flexible corporation statutes in the United States, and the Court of Chancery-
Delaware’s highly respected court of equity-has a large body of corporate case law 
that the Chancery’s expert judges rely on in navigating the complex nuances of 
corporate law disputes.25 
 17. See infra Part I. 
 18. See infra Part II. 
 19. See infra Part III. 
 20. Not-for-profit corporations are governed by the Title 26 § 501(c) of the United States Code, but 
incorporate as a not-for-profit corporation with the Secretary of State in Delaware. See 26 U.S.C. § 501 (2012). 
 21. See infra Part II.A. 
 22. See infra Part II.B. 
 23. See generally LEWIS S. BLACK, JR., DEL. DEP’T. OF STATE, DIV. OF CORPS., WHY CORPORATIONS CHOOSE 
DELAWARE 1 (2007), http://corp.delaware.gov/whycorporations_web.pdf. 
 24. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8. 
 25. BLACK, supra note 23, at 1. 
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1. The Board of Directors Fiduciary Duties to the Corporation and Shareholders 
The Delaware General Corporation Law governs the actions of all corporations 
incorporated in Delaware.26 Section 141(a) of title 827 states that “every corporation 
organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board 
of directors.”28 The statute does not further clarify what exactly is required of the 
board of directors in performing their duties, but cases interpreting Delaware law 
elucidate what directors on a corporate board are required to do. 
The Delaware Supreme Court case Guth v. Loft, Inc.,29 is the first in a line of cases 
that explains in greater detail how directors on a corporate board are expected to 
act.30 In Guth, the Court found that directors “stand in fiduciary relation to the 
corporation and its stockholders.”31 The Court went on to explain that this fiduciary 
relationship demands, 
of a corporate officer or director, peremptorily and inexorably, the most 
scrupulous observance of his duty, not only affirmatively to protect the 
interests of the corporation committed to his charge, but also to refrain from 
doing anything that would work injury to the corporation, or to deprive it of 
profit or advantage which his skill and ability might properly bring to it, or 
enable it to make in the reasonable and lawful exercise of its powers.32 
Finally, the court noted that, as a general rule, directors are expected to act in the 
“utmost good faith in the relation to the corporation which [they] represent[].”33 
Guth, therefore, set forth the general rule that directors of a corporation owe a 
fiduciary duty to both the corporation and its shareholders, and as such should 
both protect and refrain from injuring the interests of the corporation.34 
2. Shareholder Primacy and Profit Maximization 
While scholars continue to debate over what exactly a director’s fiduciary duty to 
the corporation and its shareholders include,35 Delaware case law clearly finds that a 
 26. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8. 
 27. Id. § 141(a). 
 28. Id. 
 29. 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939). 
 30. See infra notes 36–43 and accompanying text. 
 31. Guth, 5 A.2d at 510. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See id.  
 35. See generally A.A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. Rev. 1365 
(1932); see also David G. Yosifon, The Law of Corporate Purpose, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 181, 213 (2013) (agreeing 
with Berle that “the better interpretation of this phrase [the corporation and its shareholders] is to view it as 
expressing a unified, coherent set of obligations . . . . The directors’ attention is to be devoted to doing things 
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director’s primary fiduciary duty is profit-maximization for the benefit of its 
shareholders.36 In Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.37 the Delaware 
Supreme Court stated that, “obtaining the highest price for the benefit of the 
stockholders should have been the central theme guiding director action.”38 The 
Court then cited to Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.39 when it found that “a 
board may have regard for various constituencies in discharging its responsibilities, 
provided there are rationally related benefits accruing to stockholders. [] However, 
such concern for non-stockholder interests is inappropriate. . .[when] the object 
[is] no longer to protect or maintain the corporate enterprise but to sell to the 
highest bidder.”40 Revlon makes clear that a director must primarily consider the 
shareholders’ interests, in order to maximize the profits from the corporation, when 
the enterprise is about to be dissolved.41 If the corporation is not dissolved, however, 
a director is permitted to consider other constituencies’ interests, as long as they 
relate to the shareholders’ interests.42 
As is evident in the above summary of specific aspects of Delaware corporate 
governance law, corporate directors play a key role in managing the corporate 
entity. The directors retain a lot of latitude under the business judgment rule to 
make decisions for the corporation without fear of having every detail of their 
aimed at increasing the value of the corporation (a distinct legal entity) for the shareholders.”). But see E. 
Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1145 (1932); Kellie A. Alces, 
Revisiting Berle and Rethinking the Corporate Structure, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 787, 797 (2010) (“If we return to 
our basic understandings about corporations, it should be apparent that long-term wealth maximization is the 
proper corporate objective. Corporations are, first and foremost, businesses designed to produce and market 
products and increase those products’ value and relevance to society over time. In order to be successful or even 
to be a worthwhile investment vehicle, a business must have long-term prospects for viability and potential for 
growth.”). 
 36. See, e.g., Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986) (“It is the obligation of directors to 
attempt, within the law, to maximize the long-run interests of the corporation’s stockholders; that they may 
sometimes do so ‘at the expense’ of others [] does not for that reason constitute a breach of duty.”); see also 
Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 242 (Del. 2009) (“The duty to seek the best available price applies 
only when a company embarks on a transaction-on its own initiative or in response to an unsolicited offer-that 
will result in a change of control.”); Paramount Comm., Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 48 (Del. 1993) 
(clarifying that directors’ have an obligation to seek the best value reasonably available to the stockholders when 
there is a change of control in the corporation). 
 37. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
 38. Id. at 182. 
 39. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
 40. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182 (internal citation omitted). 
 41. See id. But see Paramount Comm., 637 A.2d at 48 (explaining that directors’ have a profit maximization 
duty not only when the corporation is being dissolved, but also when there is a change of control in the 
corporation). 
 42. See Paramount Comm., 637 A.2d at 45–46 (citing Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955); see also, Yosifon, supra note 
35, at 192 (arguing that a board may attend to the interests of non-shareholders when the board believes that 
doing so will ultimately serve the shareholders, and only when those interests of the non-shareholders are 
rationally related to the shareholders’ interests). 
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actions litigated and questioned by a court.43 However, directors are constrained by 
the duties they owe to their shareholders, and while there is academic debate as to 
whether the shareholders are truly the primary beneficiaries of corporate decision-
making,44 in the Delaware court’s eyes, shareholder interests must always be 
considered when a Board of Directors makes its decisions.45 As we will see in Part III 
of this paper, the primacy of shareholder interests can have serious adverse 
consequences for companies who have shareholders with differing interests that 
directly conflict with each other. 46 
Fortunately a for-profit corporation is not the only form that a company can 
incorporate under. Not-for-profit corporations provide an important, albeit 
limited, alternative to the for-profit corporate form. 
B. Not-For-Profit Corporations 
Not-for-profit corporations are an important corporate form because they receive 
tax-exempt status under the federal tax code and their central purpose is to 
promote public benefits.47 Section 501(c) of title 2648 in the United States Code 
governs the not-for-profit corporate form by listing the types of endeavors that can 
receive tax exemption and proscribes certain activities by these entities.49 The most 
consequential proscription the legislation prevents is what is known as the 
nondistribution constraint.50 The nondistribution constraint effectively bars an 
organization from distributing any net earnings they may earn to individuals who 
exercise control over the organization.51 This constraint, however, does not prevent 
a not-for-profit from providing reasonable compensation to a person for the labor 
or capital that they provide to the organization; it merely prevents an individual 
 43. The business judgment rule is “a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a 
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in honest belief that the action taken was in the best 
interests of the company; [a]bsent an abuse of discretion, that judgment will be respected by the courts.” 
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
 44. See supra note 35. 
 45. See supra notes 29–43 and accompanying text. 
 46. See infra Part III. 
 47. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (2012). 
 48. Id. 
 49. See id. § 501(c)(3) (“Corporations . . . organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, 
scientific, testing for public safety, literary or educational purposes, or to foster national or international 
amateur sports competition . . . or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net 
earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the 
activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation. . .and which 
does not participate in, or intervene in . . . any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any 
candidate for public office.”). 
 50. Id. ([N]o part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or 
individual . . . .”); see generally Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 Yale L.J. 835 (1980). 
 51. Hansmann, supra note 50, at 838. Hannsman clarifies that “net earnings” means the earnings in excess 
of the amount needed to pay for services rendered to the organization, including salaries. See id. 
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from receiving portions of profits that the organization may make.52 Furthermore, 
not-for-profits are not barred from earning a profit, only the distribution of those 
profits to individuals in the organization is prohibited.53 Any profits that are 
received must be devoted entirely to further financing the services that the 
organization was formed to provide.54 The nondistribution constraint is an 
important tool to reinforce the charitable legitimacy of these organizations because 
it reinforces their devotion to promoting the public benefit rather than private gain. 
The nondistribution constraint, however, is a problematic limitation for individuals 
interested in creating corporations that have a public benefit focus but also seek to 
allow profits to revert back to individuals who work in the corporation. 
Thus, the for profit corporate form is limited because the board of directors owe 
a significant fiduciary duty to the corporation and its shareholders by way of 
maximizing profits; alternatively, the not-for-profit corporate form is problematic 
because of the severe limitation of the nondistribution constraint, which prevents 
inurement of profit back to individuals who work in the corporation.55 These 
deficiencies in the two main corporate forms led to the creation of benefit 
corporation legislation that Delaware passed in 2013.56 
II. The Delaware Public Benefit Corporation Statute 
Subchapter 15 of Chapter 1 in Title 857 governs the formation and obligations of 
public benefit corporations in Delaware. One of the key advantages that subchapter 
15 provides is the integration of the benefit corporate form into existing corporate 
law. Under section 361 the language states “if a corporation elects to become a 
public benefit corporation. . .it shall be subject to all provisions of the chapter 
except to the extent the subchapter imposes additional or different requirements.”58 
This requires benefit corporations to comport substantively with existing corporate 
law, except where the existing law that does not adequately acknowledge the new 
role that benefit corporations seek to play.59 
 52. See id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See Lyman Johnson, Pluralism in Corporate Form: Corporate Law and Benefit Corps., 25 REGENT U. L. 
REV. 269, 280 (2013) (“There seems to be no good reason to have only an organizational bi-culture in which, on 
the one hand, no profit may inure to private persons in a nonprofit corporation and, on the other hand, the 
singular purpose in a for-profit corporation must be to zealously maximize profits. On a spectrum where those 
two institutional objectives occupy polar ends, there lies an intermediate range of possible business purposes 
that combine some level of return to ‘private’ investors with the simultaneous pursuit of more ‘public’ or 
‘social’ benefits.”). 
 56. Governor Markell Signs Public Benefit Corporation Legislation, DEL.GOV (July 17, 2013), 
http://news.delaware.gov/2013/07/17/governor-markell-signs-public-benefit-corporation-legislation. 
 57. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. § 361 et al. 
 58. Id. § 361. 
 59. See id. 
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A. The Benefit Corporate Form 
Public benefit corporations have specific requirements that they must fulfill to 
obtain the recognition of the public benefit corporate form. Section 362 defines a 
public benefit corporation as a “for-profit corporation organized under and subject 
to the requirements of this chapter that is intended to produce a public benefit or 
public benefits and operate in a responsible and sustainable manner.”60 Importantly, 
the statute clarifies that a public benefit corporation shall be managed by “balancing 
the stockholders’ pecuniary interests, the best interests of those materially affected 
by the corporation’s conduct, and the public benefit(s) identified in its certificate of 
incorporation.”61 This language is a key departure from traditional Delaware 
corporate law because the statute explicitly requires that directors consider all three 
interests when making decisions on behalf of the corporation, rather than merely 
the profit maximizing aims of stockholders.62 
Public benefit corporations also have several requirements they must satisfy to 
incorporate. In their certificate of incorporation, the public benefit corporation 
must: 1) identify within its statement of business or purpose (pursuant to 
§102(a)(3) of title 8) one or more specific public benefits that will be promoted by 
the corporation; and 2) state within its heading that it is a public benefit 
corporation.63 Furthermore, the provision requires that the public benefit 
corporation either include in its name the words “public benefit corporation” in 
their corporate name, or provide notice to any person who intends to purchase 
stock in the corporation of its benefit corporation status.64 The statute defines a 
“public benefit” as a benefit that has a positive effect on one or more categories of 
persons, entities, communities, or interests other than stockholders in their 
capacities as stockholders.65 Finally, incorporation as a benefit corporation requires 
90% approval by the outstanding shares of each class of stock of the corporation to 
amend its certificate.66 
B. The Board of Directors Fiduciary Duties to the Benefit Corporation 
The subchapter also describes the duties that directors will have under this new 
corporate form.  Section 365(a) reiterates the mandate that directors manage and 
 60. Id. § 362(a). 
 61. Id. 
 62. See Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986) (holding that the directors owe a duty 
to maximize the long-run interests of the corporation’s stockholders, sometimes at the expense of other 
constituencies). 
 63. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8 § 362(a). 
 64. See id. § 362(c). The subsection allows the corporation to alternatively use the abbreviation “P.B.C” or 
the designation “PBC.” Id. 
 65. Id. § 362(c). 
 66. Id. § 363(a)(1). 
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direct the business and affairs of the public benefit corporation by balancing “the 
pecuniary interests of the stockholders, the best interests of those materially affected 
by the corporations’ conduct, and the specific public benefit[s] identified in its 
certificate of incorporation.”67 This reiteration that directors must consider these 
additional interests reinforces the departure this requirement takes from the 
traditional corporate law principle of profit maximization for the benefit of 
shareholders.68 Subsection b clarifies that in considering these different interests, a 
director has satisfied his or her duty if his or her decision is both informed and 
disinterested and not such that no person of ordinary, sound judgment would 
approve.69 This clarification of a director’s obligation is important because it allows 
directors significant flexibility to weigh each interest based on the specific issue they 
are tasked with deciding. 
C. The Duty to Promote a Public Benefit 
Public benefit corporations must also provide stockholders with a statement 
explaining how the corporation has promoted the public benefit(s) identified in 
their certificate. This statement must be provided biennially and include the 
following: 1) The objectives the board has established to promote the public 
benefit(s) of the corporation; 2) the standards the board has adopted to measure the 
corporation’s progress in promoting such public benefit(s); 3) objective, factual 
information on based on those standards regarding the corporation’s success in 
meeting the objectives for promoting such public benefit(s); and 4) an assessment 
of the corporation’s success in meeting the objectives and promoting such public 
benefit(s).70 This statement keeps the shareholders apprised of precisely how the 
Board is satisfying the public benefit goals of the corporation.71 
 
 67. Id. § 365(a). 
 68. See id. Cf. supra notes 29–42 and accompanying text (articulating the profit maximization duties 
directors owe to their shareholders). 
 69. Id. § 365(b). Under subsection b, a director does not owe any duty to a person based on any interest 
that such person has in the public benefits identified in the certificate of incorporation or on account of any 
interest materially affected by the corporation’s conduct. Id. 
 70. Id. § 366(b). Section 366 (c) provides that a corporation’s certificate can require the corporation to: 1) 
provide the statement in (b) more frequently than biennially; 2) make the statement described in (b) available 
to the public; and or 3) use a third-party standard that addresses the corporation’s promotion of the public 
benefit identified in the certificate and or the best interests of those materially affected by the corporation’s 
conduct. Id. § 366(b). 
 71. But see Jessica Chu, Filling a Nonexistent Gap: Benefit Corporations and the Myth of Shareholder Wealth 
Maximization, 22 S. CAL. INTER. L.J 155, 186 (2013) (finding that the benefit corporate forms gives shareholders 
unprecedented power to bring enforcement proceedings against their board of directors for failing to pursue or 
create the public benefit purpose, or failing to consider the interests of various stockholders). 
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III. A New Shield Against Hostile Maneuvers by Profit-Driven 
Invaders 
Benefit corporations are a significant new corporate form that could have a 
consequential impact on corporate governance disputes. By first examining two 
famous examples of hostile maneuvers taken by profit-driven corporations to 
acquire publicly minded corporations, it becomes clear that under traditional 
corporate governance law corporations who gain success while maintaining a public 
benefit focus have little defense against these profit-driven invaders.72  However, 
with the advent of the new benefit corporate form these public benefit corporations 
will have additional protections against hostile maneuvers, allowing these 
corporations to focus their activities on providing public benefits rather than 
defending against these hostile actors.73 
A. Philanthropic For Profit Corporations Have Little Chance Against Profit-Driven 
Invaders 
Hostile maneuvers by one corporation to acquire another corporation are not an 
uncommon practice in the corporate world.74 In certain scenarios, however, those 
acquisitions are at the expense of the acquired company’s original corporate 
mission. Unilever’s acquisition of Ben & Jerry’s and the legal dispute between the 
founders of Craigslist and their minority shareholder, eBay, suggest that for profit 
corporations founded for a public purpose have little protection against hostile 
maneuvers by profit-driven corporations who seek to acquire them under 
traditional corporate law. 
1. The Unilever Acquisition: International Conglomerate versus Communal Roots 
Ben Cohen and Jerry Greenfield founded the famous ice cream company Ben & 
Jerry’s in 1978. By 1982, the two founders clarified their goals for the company with 
the mission of “creat[ing] a business that gave something back to the community.”75 
The company went public two years later, and with the influx of capital formalized 
their company’s charitable donation policy by establishing the Ben & Jerry’s 
Foundation.76 The foundation was endowed with 50,000 of Cohen’s shares (worth 
 72. See infra Part III.A. 
 73. See infra Part III.B. 
 74. In the first six months of 2014, twenty-five unsolicited, hostile merger and acquisition offers were made 
for a combined value of $290 billion dollars; this amounted to about nineteen percent of the value of all merger 
and acquisition activity in 2014 according to data from Deologic. Arash Massoudi & Ed Hammond, Hostile 
takeovers rise to 14-Year High in M&A as Confidence Grows, FINAN. TIMES (June 8, 2014), 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a8a8f608-eee5-11e3-8e82-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3rvofrOe1. 
 75. See Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, Freezing Out Ben & Jerry: Corporate Law and the Sale of a Social 
Enterprise Icon, 45 VT. L. REV. 211, 217 (2010)(quoting founder Ben Cohen in a speech Cohen gave to the staff). 
 76. Id. at 219. 
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about $850,000) and a commitment of 7.5% of the company’s yearly pre-tax 
profits.77 
From that promising beginning Ben & Jerry’s greatly expanded its charitable 
efforts over the next thirty years. Not only did the company continue to invest 7.5% 
of their profits into their charitable foundation, but the company also became 
conscious of the environmental and social impact their company had on society.78 
This consciousness led Ben & Jerry’s to reduce its impact by feeding the waste from 
the ice-cream making process to pigs, speaking out against bovine growth 
hormones, using milk that was free from artificial growth hormones, and 
developing “Eco-pint” containers that used unbleached paperboard because of 
concerns about chlorine and water pollution.79 To measure its success, the founders 
would ask “[h[ow much have we improved the quality of life in the community?”80 
and “how much profit is left over at the end of each month?”81 If, each month, the 
company had not contributed to both objectives, then the founders considered that 
month a failure.82 
Ben & Jerry’s became a rubric for what a public benefit for-profit corporation 
looked like, and both the local and national community not only took notice but 
also overwhelmingly embraced the company. By 1998, Ben & Jerry’s stock gains led 
to an attractive buyout offer from Dreyer, a competing ice cream manufacturer, and 
later Unilever, an international conglomerate.83 Despite the founders reluctance to 
sell the company, eventually in 2000 the founders declared the sale of Ben & Jerry’s 
to Unilever.84 
While Unilever kept Ben & Jerry’s operations substantively separate from the 
rest of the conglomerate and continues to support the charitable mission of the 
company,85 this case exemplifies the flaws that traditional corporate law has in 
 77. Id. 
 78. See id. at 220–22. 
 79. See id. Ben & Jerry’s also conducted voter registrations at their stores; bought ingredients from 
suppliers who employed disadvantaged populations; used more Fair-Trade certified organic ingredients in their 
ice cream; and reduced the company’s output of waste. Id. 
 80. Id. at 219–20. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 220. 
 83. Id. at 225–26. In response to Dreyer’s 1998 offer, in 2000 Cohen and a group of social investors 
attempted a leveraged buyout of the company at $38.00 a share. In response, Dreyer offered a $38.00 per share 
all stock deal. Unilever then entered the bidding war by offering $43.60 per share. Id. at 226. 
 84. Id. at 228. The founders considered re-organizing their intricate capital structure to change the voting 
make-up of the board, but the other board members did not want to take on the personal liability of testing Ben 
& Jerry’s corporate defense by re-structuring especially in light of the fact that Unilever’s bid included no risks 
of liability. See id. at 240–42. Unilever’s offer was $5.20 over what Dreyer offered, and $26.20 over what the 
stock was worth on the market. See id. 
 85. Under Unilever’s management, the new board of directors was primarily comprised of the old board 
members; and, in the merger agreement Unilever promised to contribute $5 million to assist minority-owned 
and under-capitalized business, $5 million to employees that had to be paid within six months of the 
agreement, and contribute $5 million to the Ben & Jerry’s Foundation. See id. at 227–28. 
 Benefit Corporations 
120 Journal of Business & Technology Law 
protecting a socially conscious company that is deeply rooted in local and national 
community development from being overtaken by an international profit-driven 
company. 
2. A Clash of Corporate Cultures: eBay versus Craigslist 
The litigation that resulted from eBay and Craigslist’s incompatible corporate 
cultures demonstrates how benefit corporation legislation will have significant 
impact on traditional corporate governance law and how courts will assess the 
defensive measures taken by benefit corporations facing hostile corporate 
maneuvers.86 
a. Craiglist’s Corporate Culture 
Craig Newmark (Newmark) founded Craigslist to provide the online community 
with a quality online classifieds forum.  While Craigslist is a for profit corporation, 
nearly all of the classified advertisements that are placed on the forum are placed 
there free of charge, and it does not sell advertising space on its website to third 
parties.87 The management team, consisting mainly of Jim Buckmaster 
(Buckmaster) and Newmark, is committed to the community-service approach to 
doing business.88 The company, therefore, has not tried to monetiz[e] the site,89 but 
rather focused on providing a quality service that helps connect the communities 
for which it operates.90 Other evidence of this community-focused mission is 
reflected in the fact that even after Craigslist became successful the company did not 
foray into ventures beyond classifieds.91 Also, despite its vast popularity, the 
company remains small with only about thirty-four employees and a maximum of 
three stockholders.92 While Craigslist enjoys enormous success and continually 
makes a profit, despite little effort taken by the management team, at its core 
Craigslist is focused on providing a community service, not optimizing profit 
streams. 
b. Litigation between Craigslist and eBay 
The dispute between Craigslist and eBay arose when Philip Knowlton 
(“Knowlton”), one of Craigslist’s stockholders, sold his shares to eBay. Newmark 
 86. See infra notes 87–119 and accompanying text. 
 87. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 8 (Del. Ch. 2010). As of 2010, Craigslist’s 
revenue stream consisted solely of fees for online job postings in certain cities and apartment listings in New 
York City. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc., 16 A.3d at 8. 
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and Buckmaster were concerned (as the other two shareholders) about eBay 
becoming a minority shareholder in their company because the two companies had 
vastly different business models.93 Despite these concerns, and after months of 
negotiations, eBay, Newmark, and Buckmaster agreed to make eBay the third 
stockholder.94 EBay became the new minority shareholder in Craigslist in 2004, 
owning 28.4% of Craigslist’s stock.95 The parties then signed a stock purchase 
agreement (SPA) and a stockholders agreement (SA), and Buckmaster and 
Newmark executed a separate voting agreement.96 
From the beginning of the relationship, eBay sought to expand its role within 
Craigslist with the long-term goal of making Craigslist an eBay subsidiary.97 Pierre 
Omidyar, founder of eBay, viewed his role as a shareholder as “facilitating the 
relationship. . .between [C]raigslist and eBay, help[ing] [C]raigslist see the value of 
having eBay as a partner, and ultimately [getting] that relationship. . .closer and 
closer so that [eBay] would end up in an acquisition[.]”98 Ultimately, eBay’s goal 
was to acquire Craigslist as a subsidiary.99 Newmark and Buckmaster, however, 
resisted all overtures that eBay made to maximize Craigslist’s profits, and 
completely ignored eBay’s advice in making changes to their business model.100 
EBay, meanwhile, continued to pursue separate endeavors in the classifieds 
sphere.101 
By 2007, the underlying tensions between the two companies came to a head 
when eBay launched a classifieds site in the United States, invoking the SA 
competitive activity clause.102 In response, Craigslist sent eBay notice invoking the 
competitive activity clause and gave eBay ninety days to cure the violation before 
 93. See id. at 9. EBay operates with an eye to maximizing revenues, profits, and market share. Their website 
charges commissions on each sale that occur in the forum and the court found that the company is constantly 
looking to acquire new subsidiaries to diversify and build their empire. The court also found that the central 
mission of eBay is to focus on monetization, and turning online products and services into revenue streams. Id.  
 94. Id. at 11. 
 95. Id. EBay ultimately agreed to pay $32 million for Knowlton’s shares with Knowlton receiving $16 
million, and Buckmaster and Newmark each receiving $8 million. Id. 
 96. Id. at 11. The SPA required creation of a new charter for Craigslist, which provided for a three-person 
board of directors to be elected under a cumulative voting regime (effectively allowing eBay to unilaterally elect 
one of the three members to the Craigslist board). Id. The SA set out the following provisions: 1) eBay’s 
confidentiality obligations as a Craigslist stockholder; 2) eBay’s right to consent to certain Company 
transactions; 3) numerous transfer restrictions on Craigslist shares owned by Newmark, Buckmaster, and eBay; 
4) eBay’s right to compete with Craigslist subject to certain consequences; and 5) the consequences that will 
ensue should eBay decide to compete with Craigslist. Id. at 11–12. 
 97. See id. at 10, 14. 
 98. Id. at 14 (quoting Omidyar). 
 99. Id. 
 100. See id. at 14–16. 
 101. Id. at 17. EBay launched the site Kijiji internationally in March 2005, which offered similar free 
classified services with a broad selection of categories. Id. 
 102. Id. at 18–19. The launch of Kijiji in the United States invoked the clause because it contained a job 
listings section. Id. at 19. 
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eBay would lose important shareholder rights.103 A month after the notice was sent 
Buckmaster sent a letter to eBay seeking to “gracefully unwind the relationship” 
because Craigslist was no longer comfortable with eBay’s shareholding and board 
seat.104 The letter then explained that Craigslist did not share eBay’s competitive 
business model, and Craigslist was concerned that eBay, as a shareholder, had access 
to Craiglist’s private financials and other nonpublic information.105 
Over the course of the next six months, Craigslist and its attorneys came up with 
a plan to effectively neutralize eBay’s influence on Craigslist.106 The plan consisted of 
the following: 1) implementation of a staggered board through amendments to the 
Craigslist charter and bylaws; 2) approval of a stockholder rights plan (SRP); and 3) 
an offer to issue one new share of Craigslist stock in exchange for every five shares 
on which a Craigslist stockholder granted a right of first refusal in favor of 
Craigslist.107 EBay responded by filing suit against Craigslist in April 2008, alleging 
that the above plan was a breach of fiduciary duty by Buckmaster and Newmark in 




 103. Id. The SA stipulated that if eBay invoked the competitive activity clause and did not cure in 90 days, 
then eBay would lose: 1) its consent rights; 2) its preemptive rights over the issuance of new shares; and 3) its 
rights of first refusal over Buckmaster’s and Newmark’s shares; if eBay failed to cure, then their shares became 
freely transferable. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc., 16 A.3d at 19. Evidence presented at trial confirmed Buckmaster’s 
suspicions that eBay used Craigslist’s nonpublic business information to develop and expand their own 
classifieds website without the knowledge of either Buckmaster or Newmark; there was also evidence presented 
that eBay “scraped” data from Craigslist’s website by using a third-part service to remotely extract data. See id. 
at 17–18. 
 106. Id. at 21. 
 107. Id. The first action created a staggered board that in effect prevented eBay from electing a board 
member to Craigslist for two years. The second action pays a dividend to stockholders of one right per share of 
stock; each right allows its holder to purchase two shares of craigslist stock at $0.00005/share if the rights are 
triggered (two triggers: 1) Buckmaster, Newmark, or eBay obtain 0.01% of additional stock; 2) anyone other 
than the above become an owner of 15% or more of Craigslist’s outstanding shares); if the rights are triggered 
the Board has four options: a) the board can redeem the rights at $0.00001/right within 10 days, and the rights 
will not become exercisable; 2) the Board may amend the SRP within 10 days and make the SRP inapplicable to 
the transaction; 3) the Board may leave the choice whether to exercise the rights in the hands of the individual 
stockholders; or 4) within 10 days of the rights being triggered, the Board may unilaterally exchange the rights 
for shares of stock, at a rate of two shares of common stock/right. The third action gave Craigslist the right of 
first refusal over their shares in the event a third party wished to purchase the shares. This effectively forced 
eBay to decide whether to encumber their previously unencumbered stocks, but not dilute their stock 
percentage, or refuse and dilute their ownership in Craigslist. See id. at 22–25. 
Buckmaster and Newmark approved the actions in the plan on January 1, 2008 through a unanimous written 
consent as Craigslist directors, and a written consent as majority stockholders to approve the actions. The 
actions were implemented on January 2 and eBay was informed of the changes on January 3rd. Id. at 22. 
 108. Id. at 25. 
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c. The Court of Chancery’s Analysis of Craiglist’s Corporate Culture 
The importance of this case lies in how the court discussed the divergent corporate 
cultures of eBay and Craigslist in its analysis. As discussed above, Craigslist and 
eBay had dramatically different business models, and antithetical goals in what they 
hoped to achieve out of their relationship.109 As the court noted, “the two companies 
are a study in contrasts, with different business strategies, different cultures, and 
different perspectives on what it means to run a successful business. It is curious 
that these two companies ever formed a business relationship.”110 This clash of 
cultures between the two companies became a theme of the court’s analysis.111 
Craigslist’s main argument was that eBay threatened Craigslist and its corporate 
policies.112 They argued that the 2008 plan was in response to their fears that eBay’s 
acquisition of control “would fundamentally alter Craigslist’s values, culture and 
business model, including departing from [Craigslist’s] public-service mission in 
favor of increased monetization.”113 The court, however, completely dismissed 
Craigslist’s culture argument.  Chancellor Chandler found that Craigslist “failed to 
prove that Craigslist possesses a palpable, distinctive, and advantageous culture that 
sufficiently promotes stockholder value . . . .”114 He went on to state: 
As an abstract matter, there is nothing inappropriate about an organization 
seeking to aid local, national, and global communities by providing a 
website for online classifieds that is largely devoid of monetized elements. 
Indeed, I personally appreciate and admire [Buckmaster’s] and 
[Newmark’s] desire to be of service to communities. The corporation form 
in which Craigslist operates, however, is not an appropriate vehicle for 
purely philanthropic ends, at least not when there are other stockholders 
interested in realizing a return on their investment.115 
Chancellor Chandler concluded his argument regarding Craiglist’s corporate 
culture by stating, “[h]aving chosen a for-profit corporate form, the Craigslist 
directors are bound by the fiduciary duties and standards that accompany that 
form. Those standards include acting to promote the value of the corporation for 
the benefit of the stockholders.”116 As Chandler’s analysis clearly articulates, while a 
company’s decision to embark on charitable endeavors is admirable under 
 109. See supra notes 87–108 and accompanying text. 
 110. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc., 16 A.3d at 7. 
 111. See generally id. 
 112. Id. at 32. 
 113. Id. at 32. 
 114. Id. at 33. 
 115. Id. at 34 (emphasis added). 
 116. Id. 
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traditional corporate law, if that charitable endeavor threatens the traditional 
fiduciary obligations of directors, then the charitable endeavor will not be sustained 
as a viable defense in Delaware courts.117 
This case exemplifies why traditional for-profit corporate law is not sufficient to 
protect companies who seek to earn a profit but also want to promote public 
benefits in society. As Chandler noted in his opinion, traditional for profit 
corporations must consider profits first and everything else second.118 With the 
passing of benefit corporation legislation in Delaware, however, the previously 
unpersuasive defense of a philanthropic culture in a for-profit corporation will gain 
new standing, and provide a more effective shield against hostile threats from 
profit-driven companies.119 
B. Benefit Corporation Statutes Provide New Protections Against Profit-Driven 
Invaders 
As eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. made explicit above, Delaware courts will not 
recognize the defense that a corporation who has a philanthropic culture can 
disregard the profit maximization goals of one of its shareholders.120 The new 
benefit corporate form, however, provides a novel corporate form that allows 
publicly minded for-profit corporations to more effectively protect their 
philanthropic goals. First, this new corporate form provides notice to potential 
investors that these benefit corporations are, at least in part, incorporated to serve a 
public benefit; thus, investors solely interested in turning a profit will likely not 
invest in these types of ventures.121 Second, the new benefit corporate form will 
more clearly define a philanthropic “culture” that will allow the company to more 
effectively defend itself in corporate governance disputes against profit-driven 
entities that only seek to capitalize off the public benefit company’s success.122 
 
1. The Public Benefit Corporate Form Provides Notice to Potential Investors 
As noted in Part II, Delaware legislators added the benefit corporate form to their 
General Corporation Law in 2013.123 As part of the new legislation, corporations 
seeking to incorporate as benefit corporations are required to include in their 
certificate of incorporation one or more specific public benefits the corporation 
 117. See supra notes 115–16 and accompanying text. 
 118. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc., 16 A.3d at 34. 
 119. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8 §361 et al. 
 120. See supra, Part III.A.2. 
 121. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 122. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 123. See supra Part II. 
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plans to pursue.124 They also must include in the heading of their certificate of 
incorporation that they are a “benefit corporation.”125 Another key requirement 
mandated by the Delaware benefit corporation legislation is the voting requirement. 
Section 363(a) requires that in order to incorporate as a benefit corporation, 90% 
approval from the outstanding shares of each class of stock in the corporation.126 By 
requiring such a high approval percentage from the stockholders it ensures that the 
corporation’s investors are sufficiently united in deciding to make provisions for 
public benefit(s) a part of the company’s business model.127 
The new legislation is designed to provide notice to existing and potential 
investors with notice of the repercussions associated with entering into this type of 
corporate form.128 By requiring these corporations to include notice of their status 
as a benefit corporation,129 and requiring the stockholders to vote for the new 
corporate form,130 the benefit corporation legislation seeks to provide both existing 
and potential investors with notice that the corporation is not solely interested in 
promoting profit-maximizing aims. This is not to say that public benefit 
corporations do not also endeavor to turn a profit, but rather that these new types 
of corporations will not sacrifice their goals of providing a public benefit in the 
name of profit-maximization.131 
 124. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 362(a)(1). 
 125. Id. § 362(a)(2). 
 126. Id. § 363(a). 
 127. See id. 
 128. See id. § 362(c) (requiring a public benefit corporation either to include in their name the words 
“public benefit corporation” or to provide notice to any person who intends to purchase stock in the 
corporation that it is a public benefit corporation). 
 129. See id. 
 130. See id. § 363(a). 
 131. See Lyman Johnson, Pluralism in Corporate Form: Corporate Law and Benefit Corps., 25 REGENT U. L. 
REV. 269, 288 (2013) (clarifying that a benefit corporation may also seek to enhance its profits and shareholder 
wealth, but that while a benefit corporation is required to provide a public benefit, they are not required to 
maximize profits) (emphasis added). If, however, a benefit corporation decides they no longer want to retain 
their charitable aims, and want to revert back to a traditional corporate model they are able to do so. See DEL. 
CODE. ANN. tit. 8 § 363(c): 
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, a corporation that is a public benefit 
corporation may not, without the approval of 2/3 of the outstanding shares of each class of the 
stock of the corporation of which there are outstanding shares, whether voting or nonvoting: 
(1) Amend its certificate of incorporation to delete or amend a provision authorized by § 
362(a)(1) or § 366(c) of this title; or 
(2) Merge or consolidate with or into another entity if, as a result of such merger or 
consolidation, the shares in such corporation would become, or be converted into or exchanged 
for the right to receive, shares or other equity interests in a domestic or foreign corporation that 
is not a public benefit corporation or similar entity and the certificate of incorporation (or 
similar governing instrument) of which does not contain the identical provisions identifying the 
 Benefit Corporations 
126 Journal of Business & Technology Law 
Furthermore, by providing this type of notice to such investors, benefit 
corporations are in a better position to attract the types of investors who share their 
interests in philanthropic endeavors. Potential investors who connect with the 
philanthropic goals of a benefit corporation will likely be enticed to invest in that 
type of venture, thus perpetuating the likelihood that the benefit corporation will 
remain dedicated to its philanthropic goals.132 Additionally, since this corporate 
form explicitly includes philanthropy as a component of the board of directors’ 
considerations,133 potential investors who seek only maximization of profits are less 
likely to invest in these types of ventures because their corporate goals diverge. 
The Unilever acquisition provides a prime example of how important this new 
benefit corporate form is to for profit philanthropic corporations. As noted in Part 
III.A.1 of this paper, Ben & Jerry’s was acquired by Unilever in 2000 after a bidding 
war between Unilever and Dreyer.134 Had Ben & Jerry’s been incorporated as a 
benefit corporation at the time, they would have had more effective protections 
against the acquisition. Because benefit corporation legislation provides clear 
language that explicitly allows directors to consider interests other than those 
directly related to shareholders, Cohen and Greenfield would have better 
understood their obligations as directors.135 Delaware’s benefit corporation 
legislation allows boards of directors to have more flexibility in determining what is 
best for their corporation because they are no longer constrained solely by 
shareholder interests and the profit-maximization objective.136 This frees the 
directors’ decision-making to consider a much wider range of interests, depending 
on what the individual issue requires. 
Finally, in the instance where a dispute does arise between a profit-focused 
investor and those dedicated to the philanthropic purpose and litigation ensues, the 
benefit corporate form provides more advanced protections during the litigation 
process than under traditional corporate law. 
public benefit or public benefits pursuant to § 362(a) of this title or imposing requirements 
pursuant to § 366(c) of this title. 
 132. According to the US SIF, a forum for sustainable and responsible investment, in the year 2014, socially 
responsible investors invested $4.85 trillion dollars utilizing a strategy known as the ESG Incorporation strategy.  
See Fast Facts USSIF, http://www.ussif.org/photogallery/info-graphics1.jpg. (last visited Dec. 7, 2015). The ESG 
Incorporation strategy requires investors to consider the environment, community, and other societal and 
corporate governance criteria in investment analysis and portfolio construction. The ESG Incorporation 
strategy also highlights community investing by explicitly seeking to finance projects or institutions that will 
serve poor and undeserved communities in the United States and overseas. See SRI Basics, USSIF, 
http://www.ussif.org/sribasics (last visited Dec. 7, 2015).  
 133. See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8 § 365(a). 
 134. See supra Part III. A.1. 
 135. See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 365(a) (“The board of directors shall manage or direct the business and 
affairs of the public benefit corporation in a manner that balances the pecuniary interests of the stockholders, 
the best interests of those materially affected by the corporation’s conduct, and the specific public benefit or 
public benefits identified in its certificate of incorporation.”). 
 136. See id. 
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2. The Public Benefit Corporate Form Creates a Viable “Philanthropic Corporate 
Culture” Defense in Corporate Governance Disputes 
As Chancellor Chandler pointed out in his eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. opinion, 
“[t]he corporation form in which Craigslist operates. . .is not an appropriate vehicle 
for purely philanthropic ends, at least not when there are other stockholders 
interested in realizing a return on their investment.”137  Chancellor Chandler made 
clear that, under traditional Delaware corporate law, a culture of philanthropy, 
while admirable, is not a viable defense for resisting shareholders’ profit-
maximizing ambitions.138 With the advent of the new benefit corporate form in 
Delaware, however, this culture of philanthropy defense will provide more adequate 
protections for these benefit corporations against profit-driven entities. 
Chancellor Chandler based his analysis on the finding that Craiglist did not 
“possess a palpable, distinctive, and advantageous culture that sufficiently promotes 
stockholder value . . . .”139 However, earlier in his opinion, Chancellor Chandler 
explained all the ways that Craigslist as a company was philanthropically engaged.140 
Thus, under traditional corporate law, even if a company such as Craigslist is 
organized to provide a public benefit, they cannot use their philanthropic endeavors 
as a defense against their shareholder’s profit maximization objectives. 
The benefit corporate form will be significant in these types of disputes because 
companies who are philanthropically minded finally have laws that protect their 
interests. During litigation, these benefit corporations will be able to point out that 
their certificates of incorporation: 1) explicitly name them as a benefit corporation, 
and 2) clearly explain what type of public benefit(s) the corporation is going to 
provide. In addition, the Delaware benefit corporation legislation specifically allows 
boards of directors to consider interests other than those of their shareholders.141 
With these new laws, Delaware courts will be forced to consider the role of these 
benefit corporations through a new lens. 
This legislation challenges the traditional conventions of for profit corporate law 
and will force courts to reconsider traditional corporate governance standards in a 
 137. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
 138. See id. 
 139. Id. at 33. 
 140. See supra notes 87–92 and accompanying text. 
 141. But see Jessica Chu, supra note 71. Chu argues that benefit corporation statutes are unnecessary because 
corporation’s founders already have wide latitude in incorporating unique business purposes into their business 
models. Id. at 170. She finds three key deficiencies with the benefit corporate form: (1) shareholders have 
unprecedented power in bringing shareholder suits against directors; (2) the annual report creates repetitive 
costs for the corporation because many corporations already publish and market their impact on the 
community; and (3) corporations can already act in socially conscious ways so there is little incentive to switch 
corporate forms. Id. at 186. Ultimately, Chu concludes that if states simply adopted constituency statutes 
corporate directors would explicitly be allowed to act in socially conscious ways without converting the 
corporation into a benefit corporation. Id. at 187. 
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way that more adequately contemplates the reality that not every corporation has 
the sole aim of maximizing profits for their shareholders. 
CONCLUSION 
The proliferation of benefit corporation statutes has been both swift and exciting. 
With such a rapid expansion of this new corporate form, however, questions arise 
on how to integrate this new corporate form into existent corporate law. In 
Delaware, the legislators simply provided that benefit corporation law should follow 
traditional corporate law to the extent that its provisions remain consistent with the 
other provisions of Title 8.142 While this blanket integration on its face seems to 
solve the dilemma of fitting a new corporate form into the existing law, when 
broken down it becomes clear that serious issues remain regarding what 
requirements the boards of directors will have under this new form and how those 
duties will interplay with other corporate governance issues. 
Critics of this new corporate form argue that the form is unnecessary because 
existent corporate law gives directors a fair amount of latitude in making decisions 
for the corporation.143 However, as previously noted,144 there is substantial Delaware 
case law that denies directors the ability to account for priorities other than those 
that they owe to shareholders.145 Additionally, not only does Delaware law refute the 
interpretation that directors are able to consider other interests that do not in some 
way pertain to shareholders’ interests, but the two case examples above further 
undermine the viability of that argument.146 Thus, although critics argue this 
corporate form is superfluous,147 it is clear that benefit corporation legislation has 
merit and is filling a void that exists in corporate law. 
The significance of this legislation lies in the new protections it grants to 
corporations who seek to promote philanthropic endeavors, but under traditional 
corporate law face hostile takeovers as a result of their successes. Using the examples 
 142. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 361. 
 143. See, e.g., J. William Callison, Symposium, Putting New Sheets on a Procrustean Bed: How Benefit 
Corporations Address Fiduciary Duties, the Dangers Created, and Suggestions for Change, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 85, 
105 (2012) (arguing that under the current restraints of corporate law “for most corporate decisions there are 
no legal restrictions on the directors’ ability to take non-shareholder interests into account.”). 
 144. See supra Part I. 
 145. See, e.g., Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939)(finding that boards’ of directors owe a fiduciary 
obligation to both the corporation and its stockholders, including “refrain[ing] from doing anything that would 
work injury to the corporation, or to deprive it of profit or advantage . . . .”); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & 
Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del 1986) (citing Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 
(Del. 1985)) (acknowledging that a board may consider a variety of constituencies when making decisions, but 
these considerations must be rationally related to benefitting the stockholders. Furthermore, considering non-
stockholder interests is inappropriate when the corporation is being sold.); Katz v. Oak Industries, Inc. 508 A.2d 
873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986) (arguing that it is the obligation of a board of directors to maximize the long-run 
interests of the stockholders). 
 146. See supra Part III.A. 
 147. See supra notes 71, 141, 143. 
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of Unilever’s acquisition of Ben & Jerry’s and Craigslist’s stockholder dispute with 
eBay it is clear that traditional corporate law was incapable of protecting these 
philanthropic corporations against hostile maneuvers by profit-driven companies.148 
However, with the advent of benefit corporation legislation, companies who decide 
to incorporate under the new form have explicit protections because the board of 
directors is no longer constrained by shareholder primacy and profit-maximization 
standards.149 Thus, the boards for these new benefit corporations will be able to 
more effectively consider whether relationships with profit-maximizing investors 
are good for the company. 
The new benefit corporate form provides an important new shield for these 
philanthropically inclined companies by giving them specific weapons that will 
allow them to resist profit-driven investors who do not share the same corporate 
goals. 
 
 148. See supra Part II. 
 149. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 363(c). 
